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The Supply of Legal and Illegal Activity: A Choice Theoretic Analysis - Block and Heineke 
THE SUPPLY OF LEGAL AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITY: 
A CHOICE THEORETIC ANALYSIS 
M. K. Block and J. M. Heineke 
"Much of the security of person and property in modern nations is the 
effect of manners and opinion rather than law." 
John Stuart Mill 
Principles of Political Economy 
Recently , a number of economists have begun applying modern choice theory to illegal or criminal activities. Almost 
without exception, they have emphasized the similarity between the decision to commit an offense and the traditional house-
hold choice problem. As Becker [1968, p . 176) , in his pioneering article, expresses the proposition: "Some persons become 
'criminals' ... not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs 
differ." Although this point is well-taken, we find that Becker, as well as the more recent contributions of Ehrlich [1972], and 
Sjoquist [1970] , fa il to provide an adequate framewo rk for analyzing the costs and benefits of illegal activities. Specifically, 
Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist attempt to summarize the consequences of illegal activities in terms of a distribution on wealth 
alone without rigorously considering the underlying multi-attribute choice problem. That is, the commission of an offense 
results in an expenditure of effort (which may engender feelings of guilt or "wrong doing"), the possibility of an increase in 
the individual's wealth position, and the possibility of a penalty. Aside from the penalty, the similarity between the offense 
decision and the traditional labor supply decision is obvious) Moreover, if the penalty is a monetary payment, the analogy is 
precise. While many criminal choice problems may be viewed within an expended labor choice framework, as we shall show, 
their interpretation in terms of strictly monetary costs and benefits is not as straightforward. 
For the labor allocation problem to be reducible to a monetary cost-benefi t analysis, the agent must be able to express 
every effort allocation in terms of a wealth equivalent. While this is conceptually possible in many, but as we shall show not 
all,effort allocation problems, using such a reduction requires detailed preference information. As an illustration of this point, 
consider the problem of reducing the traditional household labor supply problem to one that involves only monetary considera-
tions. Graphically, one must locate the optimum labor allocation by finding the wealth intercept, if it exists, of the labor-
wealth indifference curve along which the familiar tangency condition holds. Hence, all preference information required in 
the labor-wealth formulation is also required in the wealth only forml.\lation. The simplicity of the wealth only approach is 
more illusory than real, since reductions to this form require complete knowledge of the multi-11ttribute utility function. 
1-
j 1See Block and Heineke [ 19731 fo r an analysis of the labor supply decision when returns are stochastic. 
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We will show below that failure to fully specify the choice problem and therefore the transforma tion between what is 
inherently a multi-attribute decision problem and the wealth only problem has led Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist to conclusions 
which are valid only in very special cases. In general, we show that plausible preference restrictions are not sufficient to 
generate unambiguous supply results, a result that should come as no surprise since it is the same situation that confronts the 
investigator in most household allocation problems) Therefore, policy prescriptions in th is area, as in the tax incentive area 
do not follow from theory but rather require empirical determination of relative magnitudes. ' 
We proceed as follows: In the first section, the notion of the moral or ethical costs of crime are formalized. Next, the 
individual's labor-offense supply problem is formulated in terms of the underlying multi-attributed nature of the problem. 1 
We then present a means of transforming multi-attributed preferences into a single attribute, wealth, and reformulate the 
supply problem in these terms. This approach provides a straightforward means of comparing the present model to those 
adopted elsewhere in the literature.3 Supply responses to various parameter shifts are then investigated. As would be expected, 
under "usual" preference restrictions these responses are ambiguous in sign. Since unambiguous results have been reported in the 
literature, the next sect ion is devoted to determining the conditions under which unequivocal supply effects obtain. Finally, 
results are summarized and several areas which require further work are noted. 
The Ethical Costs of Crime: Trading Ethics 
In order to explore the offense decision in some detail, we restrict our analysis to property crimes. This enables us to 
concentrate on what Stigler [1 970] refers to as production offenses. Specifically, we consider an individual who is confronted 
with two wealth generating activities, legal activity (labor) and illegal activity (theft) and denote the time spen t in these 
activities as L and T, respectively .4 Hence, the individual's evaluation of ;lis well-being at any point in time will be a funct ion 
of the time spent generating wealth and the level of his wealth, i.e. 
( I) U = U(L,T,W) 
where U is the agent's utili ty indicator and W represents wealth. By explicitly including the psychic costs of legal and illegal 
activity in the individual's utility indicator , we are provided with a straightforward means of analyzing the role of moral and 
ethical considerations which may constrain the work-theft decision. To the economist, such considerations are specific 
restrictions on the manner in which preferences are ordered which, along with numerous other factors, determine the "shape" 
of the individual's utility indicator. We term these restrictions the individual's trading ethics and now introduce several des· 
criptively interesting trading ethics. 
Absolute Honesty 
The trading ethic of "absol ute honesty" might be characterized by a preference set in which the rate of substitution of 
offenses for wealth is zero for all activity levels and wealth configurations, i.e . 
(2) aT 1· o = o L T w ~ o 
aw u ' ' ' 
Agents possessing such preferences would allocate no time to the production of offenses no matter how much labor was 
expended and no matter how "desperate" the agent's wealth position might be. Indeed, such an individual may be extremely 
adept in the production of offenses, but an absolute aversion to the activity would prevent him from employing his talents. 
As will be shown below, this preference restrict ion implies that a monetary cost equivalent to the psychic cost of crime does 
not exist. 
2 Jn particular , the agent's s imple behavio r toward r isk contains qualitative supply implications only under highly restrictive circumstances. 
3The primary so urce is of co urse Becker I 1968 j. Ehrlich's I 1972 1 for thcoming paper is an extension of Becker 's analysis. In addition, Sjoquist 
1 1970 J and Reynolds I 19721 have adopted a choice theoretic approach in their efforts. Each of these author's collapses all costs and benefits 
of criminal act ivity into s im ple additions o r subtractions from wealth, and hence adopt ut ility indica to rs which a re a function of the single 
attribute, wealt h. 
4Lega l and illegal activity are measured in the same time units and are both considered to be discommodities. 
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Relative Honesty 
Although individuals displaying absolute honesty are likely to be rare indeed, the same revealed behavior wo uld be 
observed for the presumably more common phenomena of "relative honesty." Relative honesty arises from preference 
restrictions that imply a rate of substitution of wealth for theft that is finite but greater than the marginal return to theft for 
all L > 0 , T > O and W> O, i.e. 
(3) marginal return to theft< a WI 0 < ~' L,T,W,;;;;, 0 
aT u 
Unlike absolute honesty, relative honesty is dependent not only upon the agent's preferences but also upon his pro-
ductivity at transfer. Although both relative and absolute honesty lead to revealed behavior which excludes theft, there is 
one important difference: Relative honesty does not exclude illegal behavior, or even specialization in illegal activity, if the 
theft production function shifts. For example, increased skills at theft or a reduction in either private or collective pro-
tection efforts might lead to a non-zero level of theft activity . 
Absolute and relative honesty are trading ethics that preclude positive allocations to theft. We now turn our attention 
to a set of restrictions that , while accounting for Mills"'manners and opinion," do not necessarily imply a zero theft allocation. 
Honesty Preference 
The individual will be said to display "honesty preference" if the rate of substitution of wealth for offenses is "every-
where" greater than the rate of substitution of wealth for labor. Formally, 
(4) ~~ I uo- ~~I uo>O, L,T,w ;;;. o 
Honesty preference would lead to zero supply of offenses whenever marginal returns from labor were at least as high as 
marginal returns from theft. Jf honesty preference is a gene ral phenomenon, then differences in obse rved behavior of 
individuals with respect to participation illegal activity would renect both ethics and opportunities but would emphasize 
opportunity se ts more than do the ethics of absolute and relative honesty .5 
Ethical Independence 
One additional class of trading ethics is of particular interest - the case of "ethical independence." If K is a constant, 
then an economic agent will be said to exhibit ethical independence if 
(5) Uo = K, L,T,W ~ 0. 
Individuals whose preference orderings are consistent with (5) have the same relative "taste (distaste) for crime" no matter 
what their wealth may be and no matter how involved they might be in legal and illegal activities. In other words, the agent's 
ethical considerations are independent of both his wealth and his participation rates in income gen erating activities. Ethical 
independence is of special interest since it provides an intuitively appealing means of interpreting certain aspects of the Becker 
and Ehrlich models vis a vis the more general approach adopted here. As we shall see below, ethical independence plus a 
restriction on the manner in which wealth affects "psychic costs" prove to be sufficient fo r reducing the agent's multi-
attribute supply problem into a simple portfolio problem. 
-
1The presumably very co mmo n lrading e lhic of "weak ho nesty prt:ference" might be depicted as th e case where the rate of substi tution 
0~ wealth for offenses is greater than the rate of su bstitutio n of wea lth for labo r for any W, whenever T = L. Of course, weak honesly preference 
~111 no I generall y imply a Ztlro supply of o ffenses. If margina l re turns to work and t heft were eq ual , the age nt would a llocate more time to W<Jrk 
than th.,ft. In fact , a high enough rela tive re lurn in thtoft could lead to specia lizatio n in lhcse activities. In general, the relative magni tudes of T 
lnd L wi ll depend upo n I he intens it y o f honesty preferenc". and the ind ividua l's comparative advantage in the two ac t ivities. Certainly weak ~ones ty preference combined w ith a s ignificant comparative advantage at I heft is a pla usible hypothesis for explaining the behavior or' man tnd~v~duats who specialize in theft. O n the other hand, re lative r eturns for som e individuals could be s u ffic ien t to ind uce speciali ?.ation in leg:l 
1Citvtties. 
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Several special cases of ethical independence merit brief attention: 
First, ifK = 0 in definition (5) above, then we will say the individual is "ethically neutral." Ethically neutral individuals 
find legal and illegal activity equally distasteful and in effect combine them under the heading "work." These individuals 
probably most adequately represent the caricature of "economic man." Ethically neutral preferences will cause the agent to 
specialize in the income generating activity yielding the highest marginal return. 
If K > 0, then ethical independence becomes a special case of honesty preference, say "strong honesty preference," 
in which one's "preference for honesty" is invariant to both wealth and activity levels. If K < 0, the symmetric ethic of 
"strong dishonesty preference" could be defined. 
We have discussed several sets of preference restrictions that we termed trading ethics. Clearly, these restrictions are 
by no means exhaustive, but instead are intended to indicate the scope of the choice theoretic approach in providing a means 
of in terpreting "moral" considerations which may constrain the crime decision. 
The Joint Supply of Labor and Offenses 
We now turn our attention to a formal analysis of the individual's joint labor-offense supply decision. We proceed by 
first formulating the agent's supply problem in terms of the underlying attributes of the decision and then reformulate the 
problem in terms of the wealth argument alone by collapsing psychic costs into their wealth equivalents. Whether conse-
quences of legal and illegal activities are ranked directly in terms of their characteristics (L,T ,W) or indirectly in terms of their 
wealth equivalents, depends upon the purposes of investigation . As was noted at the outset, the wealth equivalent formulation 
requires the same preference information as does an analysis in terms of direct ran kings. However, if one is interested in con-
t rasting the characteristics of the offense decision when it is modeled as a labor supply problem, to these same characteristics 
when the decision is modeled as an "output" problem, the wealth equivalent formulation provides the deeper insight ; primarily 
because it provides a means of analyzing the transformation between the attributes of the offense decision and their wealth 
equivalen ts. And it is precisely this point, fa ilure to specify the transformation from psychic costs to their monetary equiva-
lents, that is largely responsible for the uncharacteristically unambiguous results which have been reported in the li terature. 
To our knowledge, psychic costs are transformed into wealth equivalents in all of the existing literature on the criminal 
choice. For example, Becker [1 968, p. 179] writes, costs " ... can be made comparable by converting them into their 
monetary equivalent ... " While Ehrlich [1972, p . . 6] defmes the individual's wealth so that it includes" . .. assets, earnings 
within the period and the 'real wealth' equivalent of non-pecuniary returns from legitimate and illegitimate activity ... " 
Or, in the words of Sjoquist [1970 , p. 12], "The psychic costs are measured by that quantity of money having an equivalent 
value . .. "Yet, in none of these papers, is the character of tllis transformation (psychic costs to wealth equivalents) adequate-
ly accounted for, either implicitly or explicitly . Some of the consequences of incomplete specification are explored below. 
The following definitions will be used in our analysis: wo - the agent's initial wealth 
v 
a 
0 
F 
" w 
N 
t 
- the rate of return to legal activity 
the rate of return to illegal activity 
-
-
·-
-
-
the failure, capture, or arrest rate. "a" is a 
non-negative random variable, 0~ a~ I . 
the number of offenses, 0=0 (T) andO' (T) > 0. 
the fine per offense 
wo + rL + (V . aF)O(T), actual wealth6 
time devoted to non-market activity 
L+T+N 
Note that the penalty for an offense is specified as a fine . This penalty specification enables us to focus on an issue of central 
concern in this paper, the role of ethical considerations in the offense decision.? In addition, according to Becker [1968, p. 
193-98] , fines are no t only the most common form of punis1unent, but also the most "efficient." 
owe use the term "actua l wealth"to denote t he wea lt h that an indjvidual has ava ilable to meet his fi nancial obligations. It is his initia l wealth (WO) 
plus his earnings or losses durin~ the period under consideration. W is a particular value ofW. In the discussion that follows, it is necessary to formal-
ly distinguish between Wand W. 
7For a d iscussion of the rela t ionship between fines and prison sentences as alternative punishmen ts, see Block and Lind [ t 9721. 
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The Model 
According to the expected utility theorem, the individual's labor-theft supply decision is determined by 
(6) maxjurL,T, WO+rL+(V- a F)O] f(a)da 
L, T 
subject to the condition that labor and theft levels be non-negative. In (6), f(a) is the agent's subjective probability density on 
the arrest rate and indicates the agent's beliefs as to the intervals in which the arrest rate is likely to lie. To simplify the 
exposition, we adopt the specification used in Ehrlich [ 1972] and in Reynolds [ 197 1] and fix the amount of time allocated 
to non-market act ivities .8 Further, the number of offenses is assumed to be proportional to the time devoted to their produc-
tion. Under these assumptions the first order condition for a relative maxima requires that 
(7) EfUT-UL+Uw((V-aF)B'-r)] ..;;; O 
where o' = dO /dT. As would be expected , when the psychic cost of effort is afforded its traditional labor theoretic role, the 
agent's simple behavior toward risk (sign Uww) has no unique allocative implications.9 In general , it is simply not t rue, as 
Ehrlich [ 1972, p. 9 J maintains, that preferences toward risk and relative returns alone determine the degree of specializa tion. 
Only in the special case where returns include a highly sty lized rendering of ethical costs will the assertion be val id.! 0 One 
must know something, not only about the agent's behavior toward risk, but also about the relative " irksomeness" of toil in 
the alternative occupations. For example , if the individual is risk averse but displays honesty preference, then (V- E(a)F) e' 
. r > 0 is a necessary but not suffi cient condition for the commission of offenses . While in this case returns to illegal activity 
must be greater than expected costs (where costs consist of the average penalty plus legal opportunities foregone) before the 
individual would consider committing an illegal act, for this condition to also be sufficient forT > 0 , the rate of return must 
be sufficiently high to outweigh the psychic disadvantage of pa rticipation in illegal acts. Nonetheless, increasing the certainty 
of arrest , increasing penalties, or increasing legal opportunities until "crime does not pay," (V - E(a)FO' - r < 0, will deter 
1 this group of offenders. ll On the o ther hand, if the individual displays both a preference for risk and honesty, making 
"crime not pay" may not deter participation. Also note that if the individual's preferences are characterized by absolute 
honesty the strict inequal ity in (7) always holds. 
The Model in Wealth Equivalent Form 
As we have indicated, previous attempts by economists to model the offense decision have postulated an individual who 
is able to rank all att ributes of that decision in terms of wealth alone. And, in most circumstances, this would seem to be a 
methodologically valid procedure. But unless one is careful in transforming activity levels into their wealth equivalents, one 
may end up with a model in which all the underlying labor theoretic aspects of the decision have disappeared: In effect, one 
no longer has a household supply problem , but a firm supply problem, i.e., one may lose the income term in the traditional 
Slutsky equation. To facilitate contrasting the present model to the ex isting li terature and to explore more full y the link 
between household supply problems and firm "output " problems, we reformulate the above model in terms of wealth 
equivalents. To this end we introduce the following 
" Definition: For an individual possessing wealth stock Wand allocat ing L' and T' to legal and illegal activities 
respectively, W* - W' is termed the wealth equivalent of L* - L' uni ts of legal activi ty and T*- T' 
units of illegal activity iff W*, W' , L * and T* satisfy U(L', T' W') = U(L *, T* , W*), where W is 
either W' or W*.1 2 
8That is. N ; N, a .:uns tant. 
'
1Sec u~ck~r ( 1 <n t . p. 1 (>'l 70) foo a cart!ful disc ussion of the role of psychic costs in a lloc~ling t ime amo ng legal alternative income generating 
activities. ·1 his tr~atment i, in co ntrast to his rather c~sua l acco unting for psychic costs in the criminal c hoice problem. 
10This point is discussed in more detail below. 
11 1t is interesting to note that if the individual d ispla ys risk a version h ut ha s a preference for illegal activities, (UL- UT) <o, making crime no t 
Pay in this sense may not deter the ind ivid ual. 
12 For conven ience, 1 he reader might assume that values o f I. and T a rc chosen so that W* - w' > 0. Note that L • - L1 > 0 or T * - T ' > 0 is 
necessary but not sufficient for W*- w' > 0. Whether, say , 1.*- L1 > 0 and T * - T 1 < 0 is sufficient for W* - w' > 0 depends .no t o nly upon the 
Values L*, L 1, T * and T 1 hut also upon the indivipual 's trading ethics. For exam ple, if L* - L
1 > 0 , T* - T 1 < 0 and I L * - L1 I = I T* - Tl, then the 
!lhic of honest y preference wo uld ion ply W* - W <o. 
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To aid in interpreting the definit~on, consider the case where L' == L* and T' == 0. Then W*- W' is the wealth equivalent of'f• 
hours of illegal activity. If W' == W, then W* - ~is the payment (bribe) necessary to induce the individual to supply activity 
level T*. Whlle if W* ==IN, then ~ - W'represents the fine or wealth threat necessary to induce the same supply decision. 
If wealth equivalen ts exist for any L ', T ', and -~, then in particular we know there exists a W' such that 
" (8) U(L*,T*, W):=U(O,O,W'),l 3 
i.e., the individual is indifferent between wealth level W' with no effort expended, and wealth level~ with L *and T* expended 
~ - W' is the wealth equivalent of L* hours of legal activity and T* hours of illegal activity. As is apparent from (8), W' will i~ 
general depend upon the level of activity in legal and illegal markets, L * and T*, and actual wealth W. Therefore, the difference 
between actual wealth,~, and W', the wealth equivalent, wi ll in general be a function of L*, T* and ~. Formally, 
" " (9) W- W'== C(L*,T*,W) 
Since (9) holds for all L * and T* 
(8') " " " U(L,T,W) :: U(O,O,W- C(L,T,W)). 
C is the function that maps the various effort allocations and levels of wealth into their monetary equivalent. ln other words 
C is the "cost" of L and T for any~. ' 
It is, of course, possible to express the trading ethics discussed above either in terms of the defln ition of wealth I 
equivalence or in terms of the cost function , C. For example: 
(i) Absolute honesty is the case where there exists no W*(W') such that U(L' ,o,w') == U(L ,T*,W*) for any W' I 
(W*) and T* > 0. Intuitively, there exists no increment nor decrement to wealth that would induce the 
individual to provide a non-zero supply of theft. No wealth equivalent exists.l4 Alternatively, the individual 
exhibits absolute honesty iff there does not exist 0 < W < 00, such that CT < oo, L,T, > 0. 
In terms of the cost function, the individual demonstrates: 
(ii) Honesty Preference iff CT- CL> 0, L, T, W> 0 
(iii) Ethical Independence iff (CT- CL)/(1 -Cw) ==constant, L,T,W, > 0 and 
(iv) Ethical Neutrality iff CT - CL == 0, L, T, W,> 0. 
The supply analysis that follows is in terms of the utility indicator on the right hand side of (8'). As mentioned above, I 
thls procedure enables us to interpret the existing literature within the more general labor economic framework. 
Supply Behavi.or and Policy Changes 15 
In this section, we post a number of questions concerning the supply behavior of a single agent. In particular, we investi· 
gate the agent 's supply response to changes in (i) initial wealth, (ii) the pay-off to illegal activity, (iii) the wage rate, (iv) the arrest 
rate, and (v) the severity of punishment. 
l 3Choosing w' in th is manner transforms the disutility of effort into a simple substraction from wealth and permits expression of the labor 
su pply problem solely in terms of wealt h. 
14M ore formally, U(L 1,0,~) > U(L 1,T * ,W*) for arb it rarily large w•, and U( L1 ,0 ,0) > U(L 1,T* ,W), for T * > 0. Hence, it is not possible in 
this case to red uce the m ulti-attribute decision problem to a d ecisio n problem defined o n wealth alone. 
I Sln the d iscussion t hat fo llows, we assume internal solut io ns ex ist to first order cond itions. 
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To begin, we employ identity (8') and rewrite first order condition (7) as 
(7') E[Uw(O ,O ,~-C) (((V-aF)O'-r) (1-Cw) + CL- CT]] ~ 0 
BY (8') E [UT(L,T,~)- UL(L,T,~)] = EUw(o,o;W-C) (CL -CT) and hence Uw(O,O,~-C) is the "utili!Y weight"that transfor'!ls 
changes in "costs," CL- CT, ~nto the appropriate utility changes. In addition, the term Uw(O,O,W-C) (1-Cw) = Uw(L,T,W) 
by (8'). To interpret Uw(O,O,W-C) (1-Cw) , assume, as is fl!OSt likely, Cw > 0 and no te that a one dollar increase in wealth gen-
erates an increase in "well being" of less than Uw(O,O,W-C) , since increases in wealth increase the payment the individual 
would be willing to make not to supply a given amount of effort. The value of the "net" increase in wealth to the individual 
is Uw(O,O ,W-C) ( 1-Cw). 
In most of the comparative static derivatives which follow, second derivatives of U appear in product expectations. 
This points up a well-known characteristic of stochastic models, viz. that a qualitative analysis of parameter shifts in these 
models often requi res third derivative information concerning the agent's utility indicator. The customary method of pro-
viding this information is to postulate plausible hypotheses regarding the agent's behavior toward risk as various arguments of 
the utility indicator change. For example, ifU = U(L,T,W) then R = -Uww(L,T,W)/Uw(L,T,W) has been termed the coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion. And if the agent becomes increasingly willing to accept a wealth gamble of a given size as his 
wealth increases, he is said to display decreasing absolute risk aversion, i.e. a iVaW < 0. This restriction on the agent's pref-
erences has been widely uti lized and has led to many interesting results.l 6 An important question concerns the relation 
between Rand the analogous coefficient defined on the wealth equivalent utility formulation, say, R.= -Uww(O,O,'W-C)/Uw 
(O,O,W-C). Although it would seem entirely reasonable to require R = R for all L, T, and W, to our knowledge this topic has 
not been investigated .1 7 
Wealth Effects 
A question of considerable interest to both criminologists and economists is the effect on the level of criminal activity 
of changes in the potential criminal's "initial wealth:' For example, would increased welfare payments have incentive or 
disincen tive effects on the supply of offenses. To investiga te this question, differentiate (7') with respect to wo. ln which 
case 
(10) aT/ aW0 = -E[Uw[((V-aF)O'-r) (-Cww) + CLW- CTW] + 
[((V-aF) O'-r) (1-Cw) + CL- CT] (1-Cw) Uww]/HTT 
where H = EU(o,o ;w- C(L,T,W)] . 
Neither decreasing absolute risk aversion nor decreasing absolute aversion combined with any of the above trading 
ethics provide sufficient in format ion to deduce the inferiority of illegal activity. Only a priori considerations can sign aT I awo 
at this level of generality. Undoubtedly, such considerations would lead most economists to argue that effort expended 
generating income in either legal or illegal markets is an inferior activity. And indeed , any analysis which implied the normality 
of "work" would be considered l1ighly suspect. 
Payoff Effects 
To our knowledge, most of the research on illega l activities has focused directly on de terrance and hence payoff effects 
on the supply of these activities have been largely ignored .18 This neglect appears even in much of the recent economics of 
crime Literature. For example, although Becker includes "net returns" in his form ulation, it is not central to his supply of 
offenses analysis. Certainly, any analysis of property crimes must include an examination of payoff effects as a matter of 
--16For example, Sandmo [ 1970, 1971 1, Leland ( 1968, 197 1, 1972(, Mossin l1 968a, 1968b I and Block and Heineke [ 1972a, 1972b, 1973(. 
17To simplify n otat io n in the work that fo llows, Uw will be used to represen t Uw(O,O,W-C) un less ot herwise indicated. 
18See Schrag 11 97 1, pp. 20- 1131 for a brief sur vey o f the crimino logica l li terature in this area. 
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central concern. 
(II) aTtav=-EUw(I-Cw)O'/Hrr + o aTtawo. 
Equation (11) is the stochastic analog of the familiar Slutsky expression composed of a substitution effect and a wealth 
effect. Since HIT and 1-Cw are negative and positive respectively, the substitution term is positive. 19 Hence, the direction 
of the supply response will depend upon the wealth effect. If theft is an inferior activi ty, as is most likely, no qualitative 
conclusions are forthcoming. 
Of course, this comes as no surprise. Economists have long known that "price effects" in household decision models are 
ambiguous in sign. With no further preference informat ion tile sufficient condition for a positive supply response is the 
normality of illegal activity. Without this condition , the possibility that theft is a Giffen act ivity cannot be dismissed. 
Wage Effects 
The thesis that poverty causes crime20 and the Skinnerian prescription for extinguishing criminal behavior ... "by 
seeing to it that it goes unrewarded and (by) reinforc(ing) some more acceptable form of behavior," might be interpreted as 
expressions of the hypothesis that increased legal opportunities have a deterent effect on the offense decision .2 1 This hypothesis 
is of more than passing interest. If valid, the major eff01 t in American correct ional institutions to retra in and "rehabilitate" 
the individual offender may be justified. For the important case where illegal behavior is an inferior activity, our model sup. 
ports this hypothesis. To see this , consider the following derivative: 
(1 2) aTtar= EUw(l-Cw)/HTT + L aTjawo 
Since the substitution effect of a change in legal returns is negative, increased legal opportunities will deter offenders if theft 
is an inferior activity .22 
Enforcement Effects 
In the model being investigated in this paper, uncertainty is introduced through the enforcement variable "a". The 
payoff and penalty are both assumed to be known but the frequency of penalty imposition (the arrest rate) "a" is taken by the 
agent to be a random variable . This specification is a generalization of the Becker and Ehrlich Bernoulli formulations. 
The relation between the offense decision and changes in the degree of enforcemen t has been a topic of long-s tanding 
speculation. But because the arrest rate is a random variable there is no unique interpreta lion of an increase in enforcement. 
However, an intuitive approach is to consider changes in enforcement procedures that increase the expected number of arrests 
but leave all other moments of f(a) unaltered. That is, we consider a "pure" increase in the arrest rate. This may be accomplished 
by replacing "a" in (7') with a+o, where o is a mean altering, dispersion preserving parameter. Differentiating with respect 
to o and evaluating at o = 0 yields: 
( 13) artao = -F -car tav) 
As we have noted, the sufficient condition for unambiguously signing aT{av is to assume the normality of illegal activity. 
Hence, for th.is class of penalties, we are able to assert unequivocally the deterrent effect of increases in the arrest ralt 
(aTjao < 0) _only by making this rather disturbingassumption. Of course, the reason for sign ambigui ty in (13) is that increases 
in E(a) decrease expeqted returns, which in turn decrease the individual's expected wealth. Decreases in expected wealth mOll 
likely lead to increases in effort expended. That is, an increase in E(a) has an incentive effect in the wealth term of(l3)if 
19 J-Cw >o by identit y (s'). 
20This thesis has long been popular in criminology. See Void's ) I 95 8, p. I 69] survey of the literature about which he states, " ... the conclusiot 
has usuall y been taken for granted that poverty and unemployment are major factors prod ucing criminality." 
l iThe Skinnerian inter pretat ion of the crime prevention problem is discussed in Conrad 1 t 96S, p. 303 ) . 
1~The r~ader will note that f ixing the t ime a llocation to non-market activities implies legal and illega l activities are net stochastic substitutes. 
8 
The Supply of Legal and Illegal Activity: A Choice Theoretic Analysis - Block and Heineke 
criminal activities are inferior, and a disincentive effect in the substitution term. 
Penalty Effects 
ln the past decade we have witnessed a heated polemic concerning the effects of changes in the severity of punishment 
on the crime rate. Protagonists of the "liberal" position have often claimed that increasing the severity of punishment has 
little or no deterrent effect on the supply of offenses while more "conservative" individuals have denounced this group as "soft 
on crime" and recommended increased penalties to combat growing crime rates. Al though much of this argument has been 
couched in ideological considerations, the central question concerning the supply effects of changes in the severity of punish-
ment is a major concern of policy makers. We now consider this question in the context of the present model. 
The first order conditions, (7') indicate that three "pieces of information" jointly determine the offense level: the 
net rate of return to theft , the individual's behavior toward risk and his trading ethics. Hence , by examining (7') one can find 
several combinations of trading ethics and behavior toward risk which would result in zero offenses for sufficiently severe 
penalties. Fo r example, if the world were comprised of risk averse individua ls who possessed the trading ethic of honesty 
preference, then the supply of offenses could be driven to zero by making F sufficien tly large. However, this may not be 
possible, and if not, the question of the supply response to a change in the severity of the penalty must be formulated in 
terms of marginal changes in the penalty . 
Since F is deterministic , the interpretation of a change in the penalty is straightforward. In fact, increases in Fact as 
scale changes on the random variable "a," decreasing expected returns and increasing the dispersion of returns. Formally 
(14) aT/aF = EUw(I-Cw)aO' /HTT + OE[Uwa [((V-aF) 8 '-r) (-Cww) + 
CLW- CTW] + Uwwa [((V-aF)O'-r) (1-Cw) + CL- CT] (1 -CW)J /Hrr 
Inspection of (14) reveals the substitution effect of a change in penalty to be negative and the wealth effect to be 
unsigned without further preference information. Hence, at least at the present level of generality, arguments alleging t he 
disincentive effects of increases in the severity of punishmen t are not unambiguously supported by theory. 
We have seen that if the multi-attributed nature of the individua l's decision problem is properly accounted for, then 
the "usual" preference restrictions concerning the individual's behavio r toward risk will not provide sufficient information 
to sign the supply effects of increased "payoffs," "enforcement," and " penalties." The core of the problem is of course the 
fact that wealth effects are unsigned. And, assuming theft to be an inferior activity does not alleviate the ambiguity, since 
relative magnitude difficulties then arise in each case. 
Above we alleged that fa ilure to fully specify the choice problem and therefore the transformation between the multi-
attribute decision problem and the wealth only problem had led Becker and Ehrlich to conclusions which are valid only in 
special cases.23 An interesting question thus arises. What assumptions concerning this tran sformation are implicit in the 
several unambiguous results reported by these authors? Or more generally , given the supply problem as posed in (6), under 
what conditions do changes in the various components of the return to illegal activity lead to unambiguous supply responses? 
It is to this question that we now turn. 
Ethical Costs and Wealth: The Case of Independence 
Up to this point, we have analyzed the offense decision in terms of a fu lly general wealth equivalent. That is, the "cost" 
function, C = C(W ,L ,T), was unrestricted in all arguments; only sign and magnitude restrictions that followed directly from 
the definition of wealth as a commodity and labor as a discommodity were employed in the analysis. As we have seen, the 
price of this generality is qualitative ambiguity. In particular, the unambiguous results reported by Becker and Ehrlich are 
not forthcoming when the offense decision is analyzed as a general multi-attribute decision problem.24 However, if one is 
-23We will d irect any further remarks to the work of Becker and Ehrlich only. The Sjoq uist paper, among o ther t hings, utilizes several extremely 
restrictive assumptions and for this reason is o f less interest than the Becker and Ehrlich papers. 
24The o nly exception t o this statement is the response of o ffenses due to a change in p (the Bernoulli parameter), a result that is r eported in both 
Becker and Ehrlich. A ltho ugh the reported result holds after the problem is properly specified, it is rescued o nly because of the extremely s imple 
density employed in their analyses. The Bernoulli is discussed in more detail below. 
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willing to place a priori restrictions on the form of the transformation between the multi-attribute decision and its wealth 
equivalent, then traditional assumptions concerning behavior toward risk will often sign supply effects . 
In the work that follows, we explore the implications of assumi ng that the "net returns" to crime are independent of 
the individual 's wealth level. Note that this is precisely the assumption that is implicit in the analysis of criminal activity 
presented by both Becker and Erhlich.25 By neglecting to specify the transformation between the underlying multi-attribute 
decision problem and their "wealth only" problem, they fail to account for the interaction between changes in wealth and 
changes in the psychic costs of crime. This omission is equivalent to the assumption that Cis independent ofW, i.e., C == C 
(L,T). Or, in more traditional terms, under conditions of certainty, the allocations to theft and labor are invariant to changes 
in wealth. From the perspective of trading ethics, the assumption that C = C(L,T) implies that honesty (dishonesty) preference 
is constant in wealth. 
Wealth Effects (Cw = 0) 
While the assumption that "ethical costs," C, are independent of wealth would not appear to be widely applicable, one 
should judge this assumption, as all assumptions, by its implications. To this end we replace C(L,T,W) in (8') with C(L,T).ln 
which case equation (10) becomes 
(10') 3T/3WO=-EUww[(V-aF)O' -r+CL-CT]/HTT 
As is obvious, the agent's simple behavior toward risk (thy sign of Uww) provides sufficient information for signing 
(10') only in the trivial cases of risk neutrality or quadratic utility . Generally, third derivat ive info rmation will be needed. lf 
the individual is risk averse, the Arrow-Pratt measure provides the needed information. As is well-known, if this measure 
decreases in wealth (3R/3W < 0), then the numerator of (10') is negative.26 The crucial requirement, which is absent in the 
general wealth equivalent, is that the nonlinear portion of the wealth constraint be non-random . This is precisely the effect of 
making C independent of wealth. We now have 
(15) aT;awo > o.27 
Inequality (1 5) gives the first clear indicat ion that the labor theoretic structure of the basic problem has been abrogated. 
If the psychic costs of effor t are independent of wealth, and if the agent exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then effort 
expended generating income via illegal activity will increase with wealth. Theft is a normal activity. 28 This disturbing impti· 
cation is a direct result of "independence" which collapses the labor supply problem into an "output" problem; for indeed in 
t his class of problems, decreasing absolute risk aversion implies risky assets are normal goods.29 
It is of interest to briefly re-examine several of the other supply effects reported above for the case where C and Ware 
independent. 
25Evidence supporting t his assertion appears t hro ughout the Becker and Ehrlich papers. For example, see Ehrlich ( 19?2, p . 12( w~1ere he states 
that the sign of wea lth effects, produced by equal proportiona l increases in w:alt~ in ever~ stat ~ of the world, is determmed b~ the_s1gn of the co· 
efficient of relative r isk aversion. It is easily shown t hat the coefficient of relat1ve n sk aversiOn will s1gn wel(lth e ffects generated m th1s manner only 
if C is independent of wea lt h. 
26For proof of a fo rmally identical proposit io n , see Sand mo's (I 97 1, p. 68-69( demonstration o f the negative output effects associated with changes 
in f ixed cost s. 
27This result iS also forthcoming if Cww = 0 and R = R, w here Rand R repr esent the coefficien t o f absolute risk aversion associa ted wit h the util· 
ity indi cators o n t he left and right hand s ides o f identity (8) respectively. 
28This result is reported in E hrlich (1 970, p. 3 1). 
29we have used t he designations "output" prob lem and "portfolio" prohlem. Usua lly both terms refer to problems in which wealt h is the sole argu· 
ment in the utili ty indicator, the d ifference being that output problems in clude non linear definitio ns of wealth while portfo lio problems are chat· 
acterized by w hat Arrow has called "constant stochastic returns." As far as wealth effects arc concerne d , both output and por tfo lio models yieiJ 
the result that r isky assets are normal goods, as long as nonlinearities are non -rando m. 
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payoff Effects {Cw= 0) 
For the case at hand, equation {11) above becomes 
The substitution effect in {11' ) is obviously positive and as we have seen, under the Arrow-Pratt hypothesis the wealth effect 
is also positive. Hence, if psychic costs are invariant in wealth and if absolute risk aversion decreases in wealth, then the agent 
will unambiguously devote more hours to illegal activity as the return to these activities increases. 
Enforcement Effects (CW = 0) 
Derivative {13) is, of course, still 
{13') aT;a8 = -F{aT;av) , 
where 8 is the mean altering dispersion preserving parameter defined above, which was used as an additive shift on the random 
variable a. But, as has been noted, unlike the case of the general wealth equivalent, aR;aw < 0 here implies the normality of 
illegal activity and therefore increases in the arrest rate will produce an unambiguous deterrent effect on the supply of offenses. 
Penalty Effects {Cw = 0) 
This case is a bit messier since shifts in F "scale" the random variable a. When Cw = 0 equation ( 14) becomes 
(1 4') aTjaF = E(Uwa)fl' /HTT + E[Uww{{V-aF)fJ'-r + CL - CT)a] /HTT 
Since Uw and "a" are each non-negative random variables, the first term in this expression is clearly negative. In 
addition, it is easy to show that decreasing absolute risk aversion implies the numerator of the second term is positive.30 
Therefore, both terms are negative and we have the result reported by Becker [1 968, p. 177] in his paper: Increases in 
"punishment" unequivocally reduce the incentive to engage in illegal activities. Notice that two assumptions support this 
result. The first is the independence of psychic costs and wealth which as we have seen is implicit in both the Becker and 
Ehrlich models. The second is decreasing absolute risk aversion, an assumption which will be needed unless f(a) is restricted 
to a particularly simple density function. Indeed, if Cw = 0 and f(a) is Bernoulli, risk aversion alone is sufficient for (14') 
to be negative. Before briefly examining the Bernoulli , we consider the effect on the supply of offenses of one additional 
parameter shift, a shift discussed by both Becker and Ehrlich. 
Pure Dispersion Changes: 
The relation between the offense decision and the degree of certainty with which the penalty is administered has been 
debated endlessly by cr iminologists. Well over a century and a half ago, Sir Samuel Romilly, in a series of debates with 
William Paley, held that not only did certainty of punishment deter criminal activities, but also that certainty of punishment 
was more crucial than severity. "So evident is the truth of this maxim that if it were possible that punishment could be 
reduced to an absolute certainty a very slight penalty would be sufficient to deter almost every species of crime .. . "31 
Modern support for this position has come from the field of experimental psychology. For example, Dr. Azrin holds that if 
punishment is to be an effective deterrent, it must be de livered immediately and with certainty .32 We next determine whether 
the present model contains any implications concerning the deterrent effects of increases in the certainty of punishment. 
-
30To see this, let Z ::;:;(V-aF)f} 1-r+CL- CT and let W be !!!at wealth level such that Z = 0. We must show E(~Za) > 0. If Z ~0, t hen aR<(aR) 
Where (aR) s ignifies that the product aR is evaluated at Wand hence is non-random. Therefore, -ZaUww <(aR)UwZ. If Z< 0 the a na logo rgu-
ment yields the same resu lt: Hence, -E(UwwZa) <(aR)E(UwZ). But E(UwZ) is the necessary condition for an internal maximum and n •• st be 
zero. Therefore, E(UwwZa) > 0. 
31This debate is reported in Michae l and Wichsler [ 1940, p. 250ff.J. 
32The work of Azrin is discussed in Honig [I 960, p. 380 J. 
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A widely utilized method of studying the effects of changes in the dispersion of a random variable consists of using a 
combination of a multiplicative and an additive parameter shift on the variable in question. The multiplicative shift "spreads'' 
the density, while the additive shift is used to keep the mean of the variable unchanged.33 To assess the supply effects of a 
change in the dispersion of punishment , we apply the additive shift parameter to "a", say 'f, which in turn acts as a multi-
plicative shift on F. The parameter 'f is restricted to ensure E(aF) is unchanged.34 It is in teresting to note that dispersion 
changes generated in this manner are formally identical to the changes in the probabili ty of arrest "compensated" by changes 
in the penalty reported by Becker [1 968, p. 178] and Ehrlich (1972, p. 11 ] . 
Differentiating (7') with respect toT and evaluating the result at 'f = 0 we have 
(16) aT/ aT= -F/E(a)[Cov(Uw ,a)B' + 8 Cov[UWW((V-aF)8' · r + CL · CT),a 1] /HTT35 
unlike ·the other comparative static results reported in this section , decreasing absolute risk aversion will not be sufficient to 
sign (16). For risk averse agents Cov(Uw,a) is obviously positive, but non-linear trading ethics, CL · CT, prevent further 
analysis of the second convariance term. It would seem that this term can be signed only if the function C(L,T) is linear, i.e. 
if the individual displays ethical independence.36 In which case it can be shown that aRtaw < 0 implies the second covariance 
in {16) is positive and therefore 
(17) aTt aT>o.37 
Given the preference restrictions which have been enumerated, the model supports the hypothesis that increases in the 
certainty of arrest induce disincentive effects. But clearly, this is not the point that deserves amplification. The seemingly very 
plausible hypothesis that increases in the certainty of arrest will discourage criminal activi ty, a hypothesis that is often accepted 
as fact, rests upon a series of preference restrictions, several of which are quite exacting. To wi t : (i) the individual is risk 
averse and (ii) displays decreasing absolute risk aversion ; (iii) the "psychic costs" of theft are independent of the individual's 
wealth and (iv) the individual exhibi ts ethical independence, CL · CT = constant. As we have seen, (i ii) reduces what is 
essentially a labor supply problem to an output problem and wi th (i) and (ii) implies theft is a normal activity. (iv) goes one 
step furthe r and reduces the output problem to a problem characterized by "constant stochastic returns," a portfolio prob· 
lem.38 
Interpreted in an alternative manner, inequality (I 7) may be viewed as a more general rendering of Becker's [ 1968, p. 
178] result that compensated increases in the arrest rate reduce the number of offenses less than compensated increases in the 
penalty if the agent is risk averse and have the same effect if the agent is risk neutral, i.e. aT/aT = 0 if Uww=0.39 These 
results were also reported by Ehrlich. Recall that the result reported in (I 7) rests on the fou r preference restrictions listed in 
the previous paragraph. Since Becker and Ehrlich report the same result using only (i), we next briefly consider their models.40 
33For example, see Sandmo [ 1970,1971 1, Leland [19721 and Block and Heineke [ 1973 j. 
34Formally, dE(a +'f)F/d'f= 0 and hence dFfdT = -F/E(a) whenT = 0. 
3Sof course, Cw = 0 in this derivative. If not , there is no possibiUty of extract ing qualitative information. 
36Note that if Cw = 0 then ethical independence implies CL · CT = K. 
37oefine Z =: (V • aF)8 ' · r + CL - CT. We are to show Cov(UwwZ,a)=: E[ UwwZ(a - J.l a) I> 0. No te that Z - IJ.Z =ca - IJ.a) (-F81) and henct 
E(UwwZ(a-J.la) ]=: -F8 'E [ UwwZ(Z-JJ.z) ]=: -F 8'[ EUwwz2 -J.l zEUwwZ ]. For risk averse individuals Euwwz2 <oand if aRtaw<o then EUWW 
z > 0 by ( 1 O') and (IS) above. The only remaining unsigned item is J1 z. If the individual exhibits ethical independence, the necessary condi· 
tion for a non-zero supply of offenses is J.lz > 0. Therefore, the term in brackets is negative and Cov(UwwZ,a)> o. , 
38see f.n. 29 above. 
39To interpret aTta-rin terms of the Becker result , note that "a" is increased and F is decreased such that E(aF) is constant. Since OTtaT> 0, 
the decrease in F has the greater effect on T. 
40since Ehrlich's model general ized Becker's work we restrict our subsequent analysis to Ehrlich's model. The conclusions drawn hold a fortiori 
for the Becker model. 
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A. Specific Subjective Density: The Bernoulli 
In the analysis above we have assumed only the existence of a subjective probability distribution f(a). This is a much 
rnore general approach than has been adopted in previous work. Becker's pioneering work in the area and Ehrlich's extension 
both assume "a" is either one or zero with f(l) = p and f(O) = 1-p. i.e., f(a) is Bernoulli . In other w·ords , in the Becker and 
Ehrlich formulations the individual is assumed to make decisions as if the only possible outcomes are total failure (he is 
caught for all offenses) or complete success (he is not caught for any offense). This is in contrast to the present formulation 
in which the "arrest rate" or "failure rate" may take on any value between 0 and 1. In other words, in the model employed up 
to tlus point, the individual is free to consider all failure possibilities. While both Ehrlich and Becker suggest that their results 
are forthconling for more general densities, as the results above indicate, this is not the case.41 However, because the Bernoulli 
density significantly simplifies comparative static derivatives, it does enable us to focus on the precise nature of the preference 
assumptions underlying the Ehrlich and Becker analysis. 
To see the implications of this density, let f(a) be Bernoulli in the wealth equivalent version of equation (6). In this 
case expected utility is 
(18) pU[WO + rL + (V-F)8- C(L,T,W)] + (1-p)U(WO + rL + V8- C( L,T,W")] 
For convenience, we define w' = wo + rL + (V-F)8 and w"= wo + rL +VB. Note that equation (18) is the Ehrlich model if C 
(L,T,W) is not subsumed into V.42 It is, of course, this subsuming of "psychic elements" into the net monetary benefits and 
costs of crime as well as the use of a Bernoulli distribution that restricts the Ehrlich and Becker formulations. While both 
authors claim to include both monetary and psychic benefits and costs in revenue and cost functions, as we have seen, their 
implicit assumptions concerning psychic costs and benefits are quite severe. 
To examine the essential elements of these preference restrictions, it is sufficient to consider the effect on illegal 
activity of a "compensated" increase in the arrest rate. A compensated increase in the arrest rate consists of an increase in 
the arrest rate compensated by a decrease in the penalty, so that the effect of both changes is to leave the expected punishment 
(pF) unchanged. While Becker and Ehrlich employ equal and opposite percentage changes in p and F to accomplish this 
compensated change, it may also be performed by simply setting 
d(pF)/dp = F + p(dF/dp) = 0 
and hence dF/dp is equal to -F/p. This latter approach has the advantage of emphasizing the relationship between compensated 
changes in p and the more general dispersion changes discussed above. Within the Bernoulli framework, the Becker-Ehrlich 
compensated change is a change in the dispersion of returns to illegal activity. 
To proceed, note that (19) aT/ 3'f=3T/3p- (3T/3F) (F/p), 
where 3T/31' is the effect on illegal activity of a mean preserving (or compensated) change in p, and 3T/3p and 3T/3F are the 
effects on T of changes in p and F respectively. Since the individual's optimal level of illegal activity is obtained by maximizing 
(18), if we define W= W -C(L,T,W ')and W. = W" -C(L,T,W''), (19) may be written as 
(19') 3T/31' = {-Uw(W) [(V8' -r) (1-Cw(L,T,W))+CL(L,T,W')-CT(L,T,W')] 
+Uw@) [V8' -r) (1-Cw(L,T,W")+CL(L,T,W")-CT(L,T,W")] 
-FOUw(W) [CLW(L,T,W')-CTW(L,T,W')-Cww(L,T,W') ((V-F)8'-r)] 
-F 8Uww(W) (1 -CW(L,T,W')) T((V-F) 8'-r) (1-Cw(L,T,W')) 
+CL(L,T,W')-CT(L,T,W')] }/G~3 
41 For exa mple, Ehrlich [1972, p. 9) states, "Although our model has been illustrated for two states of the world, the analysis equall y well appUes 
ton states ... " 
42There does remain one minor difference between the model specified in (J 8) and the Ehrlich formulation. Specifically, Ehrlich a llows for vari-
able punishment by co nsidering a punishment function F(8). 
43 RecaU that time allocated to non-market activities is fixed. 
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where G= pU(W) + (1 -p)U(~). ll is important to note that, in general and contrary to the assert ions made by both Beckeranct I 
Ehrlich, simple behavior towards risk (sign Uww) is not sufficient to establish the qual itative effect of a compensated change 
in p. That is, the sign of (19' ) is not uniquely determined by the individual's simple behavior toward risk . To sign (19') 
one must have information not only on the individual's behavior toward risk but also on the properties of the cost function C. 
We now show that it is an implicit assumption about ethical costs that allow these authors to infer the effect of a compensated 
change in p from the sign of Uww alone. 
To see this, consider the special case in which ethical costs are independent of the individual's wealth position . Under 
this condition (1 9' ) is grea tly simplified and may be rewritten as follows : 
(19") oTfa"f'= l -Uw(W) [(VO'-r)+C L(L,T)-CT(L,T) 
+Uw(~ [(YO' -r)+CL(L,T)-CT(L,T)l 
-FOUww(W) [((V-F) 0'-r)+CL(L,T)-CT(L,T)]! /GTT 
Equation (19") is the result obtained by Ehrlich and is, in fact, identical to his expression for a compensated change in 
p except for the fact that in ( 19") ethical costs are not aggregated into "net" returns and the penalty is fixed .44 Ehrlich, and 
Becker in a less rigorous fashion, implicitly assume that eth ical costs are independent of wealth. This assumption carries a 
number of disquieting implications. For example, if the individual, say displays honesty preference, then these "tastes" for 
honesty are invariant to changes in the individual's wealth level. Ind ividuals who differ greatly in their wealth positions, but 
only in wealth positions, will display equal in tensity of honesty preference·. Equa lion (19") describes such an individual's 
reaction to a compensated change in p. 
It is straightforwa rd to show that the sign of ( 19") is uniquely determined by the individual's simple behavior toward 
risk, i.e. the sign of Uww.45 For exam ple, if the individual is risk averse (19") wil l be positive and a compensated increase in 
the arrest rate (p) will increase the individual's allocation to illegal activities. In other words, under the condition that ethical 
costs are independent of wealth, a decrease in the dispersion of returns to illegal activit ies, when the density is Bernoulli, will 
unambiguously lead a risk averse individual to increase his supply of such activities. Crucial in this result is the specific density 
and the independence of ethical costs and wealth. As we have shown above, if the density is not Bernoull i and/or ethical costs 
are net independent of wealth, simple behavior toward risk is not sufficient to establish the effect of mean preserving dispersion 
changes . 
Since the crucia l assumption underlying Becker's and Ehrlich's analyses is the independence of ethical costs and wealth, 
it is well to recall one of the implications of this assumption. For any density, includ ing the Bernoulli, this assumption impl ies 
that illegal activity is a normal activity for all those individuals whose absolute aversion to risk is non-increasing in wealth. 
In other words, if we make the common and as yet empirically unrefuted assumption that an individual's coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion (R) decreases in wealth , the independence of ethical costs and wealth implies that illegal act ivity will be 
an increasing function of wealth.46 Surely this is, at best, an uncomfortable impl ication of the independence assumption. 
44see Ehrlich 11 972, f .n. 14, p. 55 J. 
45To s~e I his , note t hat ((V -F) 0'-ncl. ( L,T) - CT(L,T)) < o and (V0'-r+C J. (L.T) - CT ( L. ,T)) >o b y the firsl o rder condit ion a nd GTT <o by 
1 h~ s~cond order cond it ion. Therefore, t he sign of the first two terms on t he fi ght hand side of ( 19 11) w ill be determined by the s ign of Uww· Since 
~ l h~ sign of these terms w ill be opposite that of Uww. the sign of Uww uniquely del ermines the s ign of (I •/'). In fact, wit h Cw = 0, aT/O"f' <. 
.;;;;; 
o iff uww > o. 
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summary 
We have examined in some detail the individual's choice among two income generating alternatives, one legal and one 
illegal. Unlike the literature in this area, the problem was formulated in terms of the underlying multi-attributed structure of 
preferences which is inherent to household decision problems. This approach permitted us to focus attention on the role of 
1110ral and ethical considerations wh ich may constrain the decision maker - considerations we have termed "trading ethics" 
and which heretofore have not been accorded explicit attention. 
Although authors of previous work in th is area have assumed that individuals order thei r preferences in terms of the 
wealth attribute alone, they purport to fully account for "trading ethics." We have shown that this is not the case .Clearly, 
collapsing preferences into orderings on wealth alone can provide on ly illusory simplification, since the same preference 
information that is explicit in multi-attribute orderings must be impli cit in "wealth only" orderings. Indeed, "simplificat ions' ' 
wltich may appear to be forthcoming are the result of a failure to carefully specify the transformation between the multi-
att ribute model and its single attribute equivalent. 
To provide a vehicle for contrasting our model to previous work, we formalized the notion of the wealth equivalent of 
an act ion. This concept, when appropriately defined, insures that the original and transformed decision problems are identical. 
We next explored the supply response of variations in several policy instruments, and found, as would be expected, that 
no supply implications were forthcoming under "usual" preference restrictions, although "substitution effects" were signed. 
The problem was of course that wealth effects were indeterminate in sign. To deal with this problem and to provide a link to 
the Literature, we introduced the assumption that "ethical costs" are independent of wealth, an assumption implicit in the work 
of Becker and Ehrlich; in which case the pervasive qualitative ambiguity disappeared. But it was at this point that we got the 
first clea r indicat ion that the in trinsic labor theoretic structure of the problem had been violated: Independence of wealth and 
ethical costs and decreasing absolute risk aversion impl ied theft is a normal activity. Formally, Cw = 0 reduced the household 
supply problem to a firm output problem. But even decreasing absolute risk aversion and the independence of ethical costs and 
wealth did not provide sufficient information to assess the effects of increases in the arrest rate that are compensated by an 
equal percen tage reduction in the penalty. Analytically, such changes are pure dispersion changes in the ne t return, and appear 
to be signable only for the case of "constant stochastic returns"; that is, only if the "output" problem is further reduced to a 
"portfolio" problem. Finally, we briefly reconsidered the effect of such dispersion changes within the context of a further 
simplifica tion - the case where the individual's density over outcomes is Bernoulli. 
Although the present paper generalizes previous work, a great deal of work remains to be done . Among the most 
important immediate extensions of our analysis is the need to more adequately account for penalties, especially imprison-
ment, which is a unique pricing device due to the direct physical restraints on the individual's choices. In addition, the 
decision makers choice set should be expanded to include substitution, not only among alternative income-generating acti-
vities , but also bet ween income-generat ing activi ties and leisure. Both problems are under invest igation by the present authors 
and are rife with perplexing problems. 
I. 
3. 
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